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NOT EVEN DICTA
HONORABLE STEPHEN J. MCEWEN, JR.*
I. FOREWORD
"Big Steve," my dear father, had enjoyed nearly fifty years of life
before his admittance to the Bar . . . without a high school di-
ploma, let alone a college or law school degree. My Dad was an
adjuster for an insurance company and often served as the bag
carrier for "House" lawyers-those attorneys employed by the in-
surance companies to serve as trial counsel for the company and
its insureds. He was eligible for Bar admission because the State
Board of Law Examiners in the first half of this century allowed
those employed by lawyers for a prescribed period to take the Bar
Examination.'
Eligibility for admission to the Bar was merely a first step.
Gaining admission was a daunting challenge requiring strength
and determination. But get there Dad did-at about the same age
as I was when in 1981 I took the Oath of Judge of the Superior
Court.2
* President Judge Superior Court of Pennsylvania. J.D., University of Pennsylvania
Law School; LL.M., University of Virginia Law School. Judge McEwen has served on the
Superior Court since 1981 and was elected President Judge by the members of that Court
in 1996. He has served on the Pennsylvania Board of Judicial Inquiry and Review and the
Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline. Judge McEwen served as District Attorney of
Delaware County from 1967 through 1976, was a Professor of Trial Advocacy at Villanova
University Law School, and has lectured at Tulane Law School, Widener School of Law, the
Bryn Mawr Graduate School of Social Research, as well as the Universities of Bloomsburg,
Bucknell, Franklin & Marshall, Penn State and St. Joseph's.
1 See PA. Bus. OF COURTs, Rule 200(c)(1). In Pennsylvania, under the old rule, an appli-
cant was required to advertise his intention to apply for admission, pay the necessary fees,
and intend to practice in the Commonwealth. Id.; PA. B.A.R., Rule 203(a)(1) - (a)(2)(i)
(West's Pennsylvania Rules of Court Pennsylvania Bar Admission Rules Subchapter B).
Under the new rule, an applicant must possess an undergraduate degree or have an educa-
tion comparable to an undergraduate degree subject to the discretion of the board of exam-
iners. Id. The applicant also must have received a Bachelor of Law or Juris Doctor degree.
Id. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMIS-
SIONS TO THE BAR & NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
BAR ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENT 1996-97 at 16-17 Chart III. Five jurisdictions (Alabama,
California, the District of Columbia, Georgia, and Maine) do not mandate graduation from
an ABA accredited law school to sit for the bar exam. Id.
2 Judge McEwen was 48 years old when he commenced service on the Superior Court in
1981 after appointment by then Governor Dick Thornburgh.
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My Dad relied upon instinct, intuition and wits every bit as
much as knowledge of the law. He believed that once you hit the
courtroom, there were two factors: the facts and the judge; let the
big firms rely on the law. The facts were usually an obstacle de-
spite his remarkable skills at adjusting the facts through pre-trial
witness interviews (especially of police officers). The important
question for him was: Who's the Judge? Implicit in this consuming
concern are the questions: What kind of person is the Judge? How
does the Judge think? The answer, of course, controlled the inten-
sity of the subsequent "judge shopping" effort.'
Thus it is that, with a wink toward Heaven in gratitude for a
thousand lessons, we present a set of expressions so that one may
know the notions that guide, when possible, the musing of this
appellate jurist during the reflection that precedes ruling, and
thereby gain an impression of what kind of person the judge is and
how that judge thinks.
My Mother, the cherished Helen Dorothy Maloney of Bethle-
hem, Pennsylvania, would have preferred a more astute and
profound jurisprudential undertaking, but this appellate jurist,
fearful that the intellectual pickings of his own writings would be
too lean, undertook instead, in honor of his father, to reveal, (how-
ever irreverent or politically incorrect) through these excerpts of
3 See Jones v. City of Buffalo, 867 F. Supp. 1155, 1163 (W.D.N.Y. 1994). The court ex-
pressed disdain for various methods used to judge shop, warning that it allows the litigants
to subordinate the legal process for their best interest. Id.; Cheeseman v. Carey, 485 F.
Supp. 203, 215 (S.D.N.Y.), remanded, 623 F.2d 1387 (2d Cir. 1980). Shopping for a more
favorable judge the way one searches for a better forum is discouraged by rules and deci-
sions as much as possible. Id.; see also J. Stratton Shartel, Legal Experts Divided on Impact
of Judicial Disqualification Decision, 7 No. 1 INSIDE LITIG. 1, 27 (1993). Judge shopping has
existed in a variety of forms, the most common of which is to file in specific courts known to
be favorable to the position being argued. Id.; Randall T. Shepard, Campaign Speech: Re-
straint and Liberty in Judicial Ethics, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1059, 1099 n.119 (1996). If
an attorney may change judges on demand, it invites forum shopping which will bring ineq-
uity to the judicial process. Id. The Federal Rules regarding recusal of a judge reflect the
concern regarding judge and forum shopping. Id.; Joan Steinman, Law of the Case: A Judi-
cial Puzzle in Consolidated and Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict Litigation, 135 U.
PA. L. REv. 595, 618 (1987). Judge shopping is a major force behind the strict adherence to
case law doctrine. Id. See generally Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). The
Hanna court was faced with a situation where the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not
apply in a diversity case. Id. The Supreme Court utilized the "twin aims" of Erie-the dis-
couragement of forum shopping and the avoidance of inequitable administration of the
laws. Id.; Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1938). The purpose behind diversity
jurisdiction was for the equitable administration ofjustice but when "federal common law"
was applied, inequality between citizens and non-citizens took root, leading to forum shop-
ping. Id.
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published and record expressions, what this particular Judge
thinks. . . and feels... and favors.. .and even abhors.
Thus, what follows is not even dicta.4
II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Search and the Citizen
The precious balance.5
Judicial examination of a challenge to a police search requires
the court to balance the competing needs of society. On the
one hand, the need of every society, including our free society,
to provide for enforcement of its laws and thereby enable the
preservation of the common weal is intrinsic to the existence
of any society. That need in our society is, of course, described
in constitutional parlance as the "police power". On the other
hand, the quite decisive restrictions upon the "police power"
imposed by the founders and framers in the Bill of Rights be-
speaks their keen awareness of the awesome nature of the
"police power". The specific role of the courts then is to bal-
ance the right of society to implement its police power against
the right of a citizen to be free of police intrusion. This chal-
lenging task requires the courts to balance those competing
rights and then to discern: what is "reasonable" - a term
which, with its kin "fairness" and "due process", defies defini-
tion, but demands determination.6
4 Editor's Note: This condensed article contains excerpts from opinions by Judge
McEwen concerning solely the Bill of Rights and judicial deference. The complete article,
containing expressions by Judge McEwen on the subjects of: vested interests, retribution,
the FBI, informers, the Post Conviction Relief Act, the federal bench, punitive damages,
the press, pragmatism, and judicial expression, is on file with the author.
5 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id. See generally United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 588 (1983). In the
context of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the actions of law enforcement officials are
evaluated based on the extent of the intrusion on the individual's interest compared to the
promotion of government interests. Id.; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979). A
law enforcement practice is evaluated based on "the individual's Fourth Amendment inter-
est against its promotion of legitimate government interests." Id.; Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978). The thrust behind the Fourth Amendment analysis is that
the procedures are objectively reasonable. Id.; Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and
County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). The review of law enforcement activity
is "to safeguard the primacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions. . . ." Id.
6 Commonwealth v. Martinson, 533 A.2d 750, 755 (Pa. Super. 1987), appeal denied, 557
A.2d 340 (1989).
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B. Human Rights
An especially precious balance.'
The Bill of Rights in the Sixth Amendment to the United
States Constitution mandates "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . . ." The Constitution of the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania proclaims in Article 1, Section IX:
"In all criminal prosecutions the accused hath a right.., to
meet the witness face to face .... There is no more scarlet "A"
than that branded upon the abuser. An accusation of incest,
or other sexual abuse upon a child, hurls the accused into the
deepest, darkest abyss where the lash of shame and scorn is
matched only by the cries of the furies for vengeance. It is,
therefore, of no consequence that the accused confronts these
charges in the family forum and not the criminal court. Thus,
the constitutional right of appellant to confrontation is firm
and certain.
Every bit as firm and certain, on the other hand, is the human
right of the child to be free of the trauma of appearance in
court and exposure to the torment of savage cross-examina-
tion. Human rights are inherent elements of the moral order,
and while philosophers may differ as to a precise definition of
human rights, and legal scholars do not always agree as to
what may be designated a human right, they are of one mind
that the advent of mankind and of the moral order were si-
multaneous. That moral order is manifested in and by the
laws of humanity. Those laws of humanity confer human
rights upon each individual simply because he or she is a
human, and not by reason of any legislative enactment, exec-
utive decision, or court decree - nor even by constitutional
mandate or decisions of the majority. Constitutions are to be
7 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). Three purposes of the Confrontation
Clause are to ensure that witnesses testify under oath, that witnesses be subject to cross
examination, and that a jury can view the witness to weigh the witness' credibility. Id.;
Robert H. King, Jr., The Molested Child Witness and the Constitution: Should the Bill of
Rights Be Transformed into the Bill of Preferences?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 49, 71 (1992). The
approach taken by the Supreme Court in California v. Green serves as the standard for
issues related to the Confrontation Clause. Id.; cf Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980). A
jurisdiction's interest in law enforcement can compromise the right of an accused to be face-
to-face with witnesses. Id.; Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). The right to
cross-examine witnesses in face-to-face confrontation is not an absolute one but rather is
weighed against competing governmental interests. Id.; Mattox v. U.S., 156 U.S. 237, 243
(1895). The right to confront witnesses according to the Sixth Amendment is not an abso-
lute right and could give way to strong public policies and the necessities of a particular
case. Id.
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revered, and enacted laws deserve respect, provided, of
course, that their provisions do not clash with human rights.
The founders of our nation considered such human rights so
critical that they proclaimed at the outset of the Declaration
of Independence:
When in the Course of human events it becomes necessary for
one people ... to assume.., the separate and equal station to
which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them,
• . . they should declare the causes which impel them to the
separation. We hold these truths to be self evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Crea-
tor with certain unalienable Rights .... (emphasis supplied).
The Bill of Rights extended explicit guarantees of certain
human rights, and declared in the Ninth Amendment that the
Constitution was not to be considered a delineation of all
human rights, because certain rights of "the people" are in-
herent and, while worthy of constitutional protection, require
not expression there. Surely the human right of a child to be
free of the trauma of the circumstances attendant a court ap-
pearance is such a human right and is as firm and certain as
any of the rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights.'
C. Trial By Jury
The most precious right of all.9
The right to a trial by a jury is zealously guarded because the
benefits of a trial by jury are not simply theoretical but have
through the centuries proven so real as to become self-evi-
dent. As a result, our trust in the value of the jury verdict in
resolving the type of factual issue here presented-as distin-
guished from a verdict upon a complex question of medical or
product liability-should be near absolute. The founders con-
cluded that a band of the citizenry-peers, says the Magna
8 In Re Tina K., 568 A.2d 210, 213-14 n.2 (Pa. Super. 1989).
9 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeach-
ment, shall be by jury." Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI. All defendants in a criminal prosecu-
tion are entitled to a trial by jury. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The right to a trial by jury is
preserved for matters exceeding $20. Id.; Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888). The
Supreme Court noted, in dicta, that petty offenses would not entitle the accused to the right
of a jury trial. Id.; see also Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974). A dividing
line where criminal trials necessitate juries are offenses carrying punishment of more than
six months. Id.; District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628-29 (1937). The degree of
severity of punishment needed to invoke the right of trial by jury is to be determined "by
objective standards such as may be observed in the laws and practices of the community
taken as a gauge of its social and ethical judgments." Id.
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Carta-is naturally suited to the task of resolving factual dis-
putes, whether the difference in testimony be innocent or in-
fluenced by personal interest; in addition, of course, it is an
obvious and certain fact that the court room cause-whether
it be of an accused or of a litigant-is, if not prudently never
left to the sovereign, always more wisely entrusted to the peo-
ple than to the government or any of its branches.
Once we acknowledge that the value of the jury system is not
mere premise but fact, it naturally follows that the verdict of
a jury should be considered to be controlling and final. While
it is undisputed that a safety valve is necessary and that a
trial judge should be able to reject a verdict, that safety valve
should be triggered only when there is a gross disparity be-
tween the verdict and the evidence or there has been gross
and harmful error. Neither of those tests are here met. 10
... and how well the jury system works."
Constitutional scholars have proclaimed that the right of a
citizen to a trial by jury is the single, most indispensable de-
vice of the system of justice in a free society. The observation
has been made that the jury system permits the Goddess of
Justice a glimpse from beneath her blindfold. Certainly it is
beyond dispute that a trial by jury is the purest method of
resolving a factual dispute. It is most reassuring to witness
how generally well juries carry out their appointed task. The
duty of the jury in the instant case was to determine if the
occurrence was the fault of appellant and/or the fault of appel-
lee, or if it was an accident for which fault and responsibility
should not be placed on either driver. And for whatever part
such notions as negligence, contributory negligence, negli-
gence per se, unavoidable accident and strict liability, as well
as the distinctions among them, might have played in the de-
liberations and decision of the jury, our review of the record
indicates that the issue was a classic question for a jury deci-
sion and that the jury performed its duty well. 12
10 Saylor v. Rose, 466 A.2d 686, 690 (Pa. Super. 1983) (McEwen, J., dissenting).
11 See Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53 (1942) (noting right to jury trial is
so important it must be "jealously guarded by the courts"); see also Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (observing that while they may not be indispensable, trial by jury
has "value and importance"). See generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (explaining
that history of protection given to right to jury trial is illustrative of fundamental nature of
right), reh'g denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968).
12 Bumbarger v. Kaminsky, 457 A.2d 552, 555-56 (Pa.Super. 1983) (emphasis supplied).
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D. Balancing the Rights
Totality of circumstances ... the standard of common sense...
an apt constitutional balance. 1
3
I am obliged under the McCutchen Rule-the interested adult
rule-pronounced by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669, cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 934, 96 S. Ct. 1147, 47 L. Ed.2d 341 (1975),
to join in the very able majority Opinion but am nonetheless
dismayed that we may not consider the totality of the circum-
stances in such cases and must instead employ a narrow,
rigid per se rule of exclusion. Commonwealth v. Henderson,
496 Pa. 349, 437 A.2d 387 (1981). The United States
Supreme Court has made clear that the Federal Constitution
does not mandate so unyielding a requirement as the Mc-
Cutchen Rule. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 99 S. Ct.
2560, 61 L. Ed.2d 197 (1979). So rigorous an approach seems,
in a word, unreasonable. Our society is far better served-
while still adequately protected from the intrusion of govern-
ment-by a criminal justice system that achieves the goal of
fairness. Thus, while the citizens of this Commonwealth
would be far better served by application of the totality of the
circumstances rule in such cases as we here examine, this
court has no alternative but to comply with the edict of our
Supreme Court in McCutchen, supra. 14
The courts are not the theatre of the absurd.15
13 See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417, 419 (1996). The "totality of the circumstances"
test de-emphasizes strict rules and allows flexibility to scrutinize potentially relevant facts.
Id. See also Moorman v. Kentucky Higher Educ. Assistance Auth., 44 B.R. 135, 137-38
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1984). There are circumstances in which applying mathematical equa-
tions will not adequately answer questions and a circumstance test is needed to adequately
serve the goals of equity. Id. See generally, Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993). When determining the overall atmosphere of the workplace, more accurate determi-
nations can be made by observing all the relevant circumstances rather than applying a
bright line rule. Id.; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). In the context of
determining whether a search was voluntary, a factual analysis, rather than any bright
line formula, is more effective and therefore in these instances the "totality of the circum-
stances" test should apply. Id.
14 Commonwealth v. Carr, 466 A.2d 1030, 1035 (Pa. Super. 1983) (McEwen, J., concur-
ring), reargument en banc denied, 486 A.2d 1328 (1985).
15 See Louis S. Muldrow & William D. Underwood, Application of the Harmless Error
Standard to Errors in the Charge, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 815, 823 (1996). Often for the sake of
adhering to technicalities, a reversal for minor error leads to absurd results. Id.; see also
Dick R. Schlegel, The Evolution of Harmless Error in Iowa: Where Do We Go From Here?,
43 DRAKcE L. REv. 547, 550 (1995). Often the reversal based on error committed at the trial
level was so trivial as to invite an absurd result. Id.; Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S.
750, 765 (1946). The rule established in Kotteakos was that the error must be substantial to
reverse a trial court determination. Id.
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It is only when appellate scrutiny of the entire record results
in the conclusion that prejudice has occurred, that such an
omission can rise to a defect and the voidable should become
void.
The division of appellate thought upon this issue is, perhaps,
a reflection of the philosophic difference that distinguishes
those devoted to revision from those committed to tradition.
While we have, in recent decades, witnessed urgent, very nec-
essary and beneficial changes in the criminal justice system,
e.g., the right to counsel, the zeal of some revisionists has
caused them to race to establish requirements that defy com-
mon sense as well as sound jurisprudence, as if to frantically
expiate a sense of guilt for shortcomings that were too long
present but have now been corrected. While the judiciary is
not to be stampeded by public opinion, neither is it to be obliv-
ious to currents flowing within the citizenry. Even the clois-
tered must hear the cry of the citizenry in distress over what
is perceived to be unsound excesses. And however heartened
they may be at the personal pronouncement of Chief Justice
Eagen that he refuses "to join in any decision which reverses
a plea of guilty solely on super-technical grounds", Common-
wealth v. Ward, supra 483 Pa. at 59, 394 A.2d at 537, that
declaration becomes mere solace since it was but an expres-
sion of a minority view.
It would approach absurdity for us to here rule that the fail-
ure of the trial judge to advise of the need for jury verdict una-
nimity rendered the colloquy inadequate, defective and void,
thereby requiring this matter to now proceed through a
trial. 16
Ritual should never trump reality.
The esteemed author of the majority view quite aptly ex-
presses the principles which presently prevail and require
this Court to conclude that appellant must be permitted to
withdraw his guilty plea. I write but to echo my conviction
that a bald assertion of innocence should not by itself consti-
tute fair and just reason for allowing appellant to withdraw a
guilty plea prior to sentencing but, instead, that: "a pre-sen-
tence assertion of innocence may compose the required "fair
and just reason" provided that the totality of circumstances
reflected by the record does not establish otherwise." Com-
16 Commonwealth v. Anthony, 453 A.2d 600, 604 (Pa. Super. 1982), affd, 475 A.2d 1303
(1984).
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monwealth v. Cole, 564 A.2d 203, 208 (Pa.Super. 1989) (con-
curring opinion by McEwen, J.). Such a standard would more
wisely serve reason, not to mention the citizenry, without in-
truding upon the fundamental rights of those defendants who
present a valid basis for withdrawal.' 7
E. Equality
Government must rise above the biases of its people.'
8
Equal justice for all is not simply an expression of boast, it
must be, as well, a declaration of goal. And so it is that this
Court is here called upon to interpret and execute the man-
date issued by the United States Supreme Court in Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed.2d 69 (1986).
[The exclusion of potential jurors based solely on race is
prohibited.]
Only the uninitiated will deny that some proportion of prose-
cutors are disposed to preclude blacks from service as jurors.
Those prosecutors argue that the practice of such bias by the
prosecution is but an exercise in advocacy to which they are
compelled because (1) blacks are less conviction minded than
other discernible segments of the populace, and (2) there ex-
ists on the part of black jurors an inbred bias in favor of black
defendants. Aside from the sociological repugnance of these
assertions, such a rationale merits but summary rejection
since it ignores the quite fundamental precept that a govern-
ment of the people must not be permitted to display any of the
failings of her people. And, of course, that explanation also
overlooks the mother's knee adage that two wrongs do not
make a right. 9
17 Commonwealth v. Rish, 606 A.2d 946, 948 (Pa. Super. 1992).
18 See McCrory v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 968-69 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting to
denial of cert.). Peremptory challenges are protected so long as the power granted by them
is not utilized in an unconstitutional manner. Id. These challenges cannot be used so as to
give rise to discriminatory practices in the courts, otherwise the judicial process would be
giving effect to such biases. Id.; Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946). The
exclusion of a specified class of potential jurors raises concerns about how effective our
system of jury trials can operate. Id. Preventing women and minorities from serving on
juries effectively prevents democracy as it was envisioned by the Framers of the Constitu-
tion and therefore should not be given effect. Id.; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303,
308 (1879). Singling out minorities for the purpose of their exclusion to sit on juries would
be using the law to effectuate the prejudices of those who seek to withhold this right. Id.
19 Commonwealth v. Jackson, 562 A.2d 338, 359 (Pa. Super. 1989) (McEwen, J., dissent-
ing), appeal denied, 578 A.2d 926 (1990).
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III. DEFERENCE: THE VERBAL BOUQUET
A feature of interest to many who have been witness to congres-
sional proceedings, both in the Senate and in the House, is the
custom of using terms of respect and phrases of admiration when-
ever one member of either chamber refers to another member.20
That custom calls for use of terms of respect and esteem even
when there is, in fact, a far less than cordial relationship between
the two members.2 Such courtliness is admirable because it im-
poses an atmosphere of civility upon the proceedings, and, as well,
enhances the dignity of the institution of the Congress.2 2
Thus, when I commenced upon the career of judging, I borrowed
the custom of the Congress and commenced upon the practice of
deference when referring to a judicial colleague, whether upon the
trial or appellate bench.
The distinguished [trial judge] was without the benefit of
these recent holdings which compel us to conclude that utili-
zation of the statement at issue resulted in more than mere de
minimis prejudice and, indeed, as [the trial judge] notes in his
20 The members of Congress often refer to their "distinguished" colleagues as such and
often give deference to the "gentleman" or "gentlewoman." See, e.g., 143 CONG. REC. H1189-
07, H1189 (daily ed. March 20, 1997) (statement of Rep. Pelosi). The first words spoken in
hearings by a speaker are often to thank a gentleman for yielding the floor by referring to
them as distinguished followed by their title and state of origin. Id.; 143 CONG. REC. H1192-
01, H1193 (daily ed. March 20, 1997) (statement of Rep. Armey). Rep. Armey, was referred
to by the prior speaker as "the gentleman" for yielding the floor even in a debate on abor-
tion rights. Id.; 143 CONG. REC. H989-01, H997 (daily ed. March 13, 1997) (statement by
Rep. McCarthey). Rep. McCarthey concluded her remarks by allowing "the gentleman from
New York, the distinguished ranking member of the Committee" the time needed by her to
speak. Id.
21 See PHILLIP J. COOPER, BATrTLES ON THE BENCH: CONFLICT INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
1 (1995). The members of the court before hearing arguments ritually shake hands, despite
being known to "shake fists." Id.; see also Ruth Bader Ginsberg, Speaking in a Judicial
Voice, in SUPREME COURT POLrrICs: THE INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES 211 (Susan Low
Block & Thomas G. Krattenmaker eds., 1994). In writing an opinion separate from the
majority, the tone should be sensitive to the attitudes and beliefs of the other members of
the bench. Id.
22 See ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 3(B)(3) (1990). One role a judge has is to
ensure "order and decorum" in proceedings before the court. Id.; cf Ronald J. Gilson and
Robert M. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers
in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 545 (1993). Many lawyers turn away clients they
believe are interested in their services merely to be adversarial to the opposing side. Id. But
cf Byron C. Keeling, A Prescription For Healing the Crisis in Professionalism: Shifting the
Burden of Enforcing Professional Standards of Conduct, 25 TEx. TECH L. REV. 31, 31-32
(1993). Rather than cooperate in accordance with the rules, attorneys often engage in prac-
tices to stall litigation and "beat their opponents into submission" using the guise that this
course of action advances the best interests of their clients. Id.
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able opinion, the statement was the "chief evidence" of appel-
lant's guilt.23
The expression of position by the author of the majority view
is, as her colleagues have come to expect, most perceptive
and, as well, persuasive. Thus it is that I rush to concur in
the decision of the majority to affirm the judgment entered by
the trial court in favor of appellee. I differ, however, with the
declaration of the majority that .... 2 4
The author of the lead opinion has, in his usual manner, pro-
vided an insightful analysis of the arguments presented in
this appeal, and has as well, expressed his view in a most per-
suasive fashion. Thus it is that I am most reluctant to differ.
Nonetheless, I am compelled to this dissent because ....
The issues which confront this Court in this appeal are of
such importance and difficulty that unanimity of view is un-
derstandably impossible. I can, however, afford to be succinct
since my esteemed colleagues have so carefully and thought-
fully analyzed these complex and urgent issues. I am com-
pelled to an expression, nonetheless, since I share the view of
Judge Cavanaugh that judgment n.o.v. should have been en-
tered on the promissory estoppel claim, while joining the opin-
ion of President Judge Cirillo on all other issues.26
The esteemed author of the majority view has, in his usual
fashion, very thoroughly analyzed the assertions of appellant
and quite persuasively expressed the reasons why this appeal
must be rejected. I join in the rulings of the majority in every
respect save one, namely, I share the concurring thought of
our learned colleague, Judge Donald E. Wieand, that the of-
fense of aggravated assault followed and was thereby sepa-
rate and distinct from the crime of robbery.27
23 Commonwealth v. Brady, 487 A.2d 891, 893 (Pa. Super. 1985), rev'd, 507 A.2d 66
(1986).
24 Russell v. Hubicz, 624 A.2d 175, 182 (Pa. Super. 1993) (McEwen, J., concurring), ap-
peal denied, 634 A.2d 1117 (1993).
25 Johnson v. Beane, 616 A.2d 648, 654 (Pa. Super. 1992) (McEwen, J., dissenting), affd,
664 A.2d 96 (1995).
26 Paul v. Lankenau Hospital, 543 A.2d 1148, 1165 (Pa. Super. 1988) (McEwen, J., con-
curring and dissenting), rev'd, 569 A.2d 346 (1990).
27 Commonwealth v. Adams, 504 A.2d 1264, 1273 (Pa. Super. 1986) (McEwen, J.,
concurring).
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I share the view that the statements under discussion were
not admissible and that, therefore, a new trial must be
granted. I write simply to observe that, as much as I envy the
persuasive skills of my eminent colleagues who would revise
the vicarious admission rule, I would retain the rule in its
present form for all of the reasons that have made it
traditional.2"
The standard of review most commonly employed by the ap-
pellate courts is to determine whether the decision of the trial
court composes an "abuse of discretion" ....
.... Since this appellate tribunal is a constant witness to the
intense and careful study provided by the trial judges of this
Commonwealth to the issues which confront them, it seems
somewhat inappropriate, when a disagreement with the trial
court, even though deep, is but a difference of opinion, to label
that difference of opinion "an abuse of discretion."
Thus, the appellate courts might better serve to rely for rever-
sal, in such cases, upon a different label, such as, for example,
the phrase-"carefully considered difference of opinion." Such
a term does not lose the restriction that we refrain from sub-
stitution of our opinion for that of the hearing court. Rather, it
simply substitutes a label which more aptly, and, perhaps
more sensitively, describes the basis for appellate reversal of
the hearing tribunal.2 9
As the foregoing examples reveal, deference once begun, moves
rather naturally to practice and even custom. Nonetheless, court-
liness is not nearly so uniform a practice in the judiciary as it is in
the Congress, as I quickly learned.
It seems that a venerable judge was my colleague upon a three-
member panel during my early months as I launched upon the
practice of labeling as distinguished the trial judge whose ruling
was the subject of consideration of our panel. When my veteran
colleague, who was held in wide and deep admiration and affec-
tion, only concurred in my opinion, instead of joining, I inquired as
to whether I could provide such an adjustment to the rationale or
the text as would enable him to join fully and not simply concur in
28 DeFrancesco v. Western Pennsylvania Water Co., 478 A.2d 1295, 1317 (Pa. Super.
1984) (McEwen, J., concurring).
29 Hanna v. Key Computer Systems, Inc., 562 A.2d 327, 329 (Pa. Super. 1989), appeal
denied, 574 A.2d 69 (1990).
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the result. He quickly counseled that a quite simple adjustment of
but one word would do it: "You refer to that trial judge as distin-
guished. He is not. He is a judge in this county and I can assure
you there is no redeeming adjective you can lay on him." Well, my
colleague was tried and true, and I was brand new, so I deleted
the adjective of bouquet.
A few months later, however, the same situation arose. I again
contacted my veteran colleague as to whether an adjustment was
possible and once again he advised that the trial judge in this case
was not eligible for the "distinguished" label. When I called his
attention to the fact that this time the undistinguished judge was
not from his county, he responded that he's from the county next
over, that he knew all of his mates, and that they tell me that he is
far from distinguished.
I was concerned that even though my practice of deference was
just underway, it was already imperiled. However, that venerable
colleague and I soon reached an accommodation: Whenever I used
the label distinguished or learned or eminent or the like, but he
perceived the judge as otherwise, he would ask me to delete the
bouquet only when the judge was from his very own county, and
when the undistinguished judge was from another county, he
would join in the label distinguished, however actually undist-
inguished the jurist. And, happily, may I tell you that during the
several years we served together thereafter, he never again
objected.
IV. CONCLUSION
The display of deference to colleagues is so prudent as to be ur-
gent. It reflects quite favorably upon the Court as an institution,
promotes the collegiality which so nicely conditions the work place
climate, and, as importantly, encourages meaningful jurispruden-
tial discussion. While virtue is its own reward, deference in dis-
sent can also be a device to encourage a more open-minded consid-
eration of the rationale of the dissent and to soften criticism when
a reviewer is disturbed by the notions of the dissent.
And so it is that ... I defer!
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